The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. hTIOSQ>M2P22PQFAH (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). In the same vein, Sorenson[39] argues that unexpected technological breakthroughs in weaponry raise instability in arms races. > Table 13. As will hold for the following tables, the most preferred outcome is indicated with a 4, and the least preferred outcome is indicated with a 1., Actor As preference order: DC > CC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DD > DC. One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. While each actors greatest preference is to defect while their opponent cooperates, the prospect of both actors defecting is less desirable then both actors cooperating. An approximation of a Stag Hunt in international relations would be an international treaty such as the Paris Climate Accords, where the protective benefits of environmental regulation from the harms of climate change (in theory) outweigh the benefits of economic gain from defecting. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? The original stag hunt dilemma is as follows: a group of hunters have tracked a large stag, and found it to follow a certain path. One final strategy that a safety-maximizing actor can employ in order to maximize chances for cooperation is to change the type of game that exists by using strategies or policies to affect the payoff variables in play. However, in Deadlock, the prospect of both actors defecting is more desirable than both actors cooperating. The Stag Hunt game, derived from Rousseaus story, describes the following scenario: a group of two or more people can cooperate to hunt down the more rewarding stag or go their separate ways and hunt less rewarding hares. Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. However, both hunters know the only way to successfully hunt a stag is with the other's help. While they lie in wait, uncertain of their prospects, rabbits hop by, tempting members of the band to defect in favor of smaller but surer prey. One is the coordination of slime molds. Finally, I discuss the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory in practice. 0000016501 00000 n The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. The best response correspondences are pictured here. A sudden drop in current troop levels will likely trigger a series of responses that undermine the very peace and stability the United States hopes to achieve. Uses of Game Theory in International Relations As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. The Stag Hunt represents an example of compensation structure in theory. Beding (2008), but also in international relations (Jervis 1978) and macroeconomics (Bryant 1994). The Stag Hunt - YouTube International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. . If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. [40] Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 2 (1978): 167-214. December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. In chapter 6 of Man, the State, and War, precursor of the anarchical view of international relations, and an extension of the stag-hunt example: [55] See also Bostrom, Superintelligence at Chapter 14. The first technology revolution caused World War I. A major terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan would represent a kind of equal opportunity disaster and should make a commitment to establishing and preserving a capable state of ultimate value to all involved. The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. 0000002252 00000 n An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. Actor As preference order: CC > DC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CC > CD > DD > DC. [13] Tesla Inc., Autopilot, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot. I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. [21] Moreover, racist algorithms[22] and lethal autonomous weapons systems[23] force us to grapple with difficult ethical questions as we apply AI to more society realms. Evaluate this statement. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. [43] Edward Moore Geist, Its already too late to stop the AI arms race We must manage it instead, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 5(2016): 318321. [51] An analogous scenario in the context of the AI Coordination Problem could be if both international actors have developed, but not yet unleashed an ASI, where knowledge of whether the technology will be beneficial or harmful is still uncertain. hRj0pq%[a00a IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U We see this in the media as prominent news sources with greater frequency highlight new developments and social impacts of AI with some experts heralding it as the new electricity.[10] In the business realm, investments in AI companies are soaring. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. 2.2 Prominent Actors in International Relations - Pearson The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? Read about me, or email me. This makes the risk twofold; the risk that the stag does not appear, and the risk that another hunter takes the kill. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. They will be tempted to use the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban and the upcoming election season to score quick points at their rivals expense, foregoing the kinds of political cooperation that have held the country together until now. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. PDF A game theory view of the relationship between the U.S., China and Taiwan What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? to Be Made in China by 2030, The New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, [33] Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence., [34] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier.. Deadlock occurs when each actors greatest preference would be to defect while their opponent cooperates. This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. PDF The Stag Hunt - University of California, Irvine Stag Hunts: fascinating and useful game theory model for collective The payoff matrix would need adjusting if players who defect against cooperators might be punished for their defection. To what extent are today's so-called 'new wars' (Mary Kaldor) post Clausewitzean in nature? Here, we have the formation of a modest social contract. For example, if the players could flip a coin before choosing their strategies, they might agree to correlate their strategies based on the coin flip by, say, choosing ballet in the event of heads and prize fight in the event of tails. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Moreover, they also argue that pursuing all strategies at once would also be suboptimal (or even impossible due to mutual exclusivity), making it even more important to know what sort of game youre playing before pursuing a strategy[59]. [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. 0000004367 00000 n [46] Charles Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, International Security 19, 3(1994): 50-90. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 Catching the stagthe peace and stability required to keep Afghanistan from becoming a haven for violent extremismwould bring political, economic, and social dividends for all of them. Specifically, it is especially important to understand where preferences of vital actors overlap and how game theory considerations might affect these preferences. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. Throughout history, armed force has been a ubiquitous characteristic of the relations between independent polities, be they tribes, cities, nation-states or empires. These remain real temptations for a political elite that has survived decades of war by making deals based on short time horizons and low expectations for peace. In game theory, the stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . Gray[36] defines an arms race as two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attain to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified . Both actors see the potential harms from developing AI to be significant greater than the potential benefits, but expect that cooperating to develop AI could still result in a positive benefit for both parties. [23] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Pathways to Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons, United Nations, October 23, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/pathways-to-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons/. 0000018184 00000 n The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. Your application of the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game to international trade agreements raises a few very interesting and important questions for the application of game theory to real-life strategic situations. In the event that both actors are in a Stag Hunt, all efforts should be made to pursue negotiations and persuade rivals of peaceful intent before the window of opportunity closes. Donna Franks, an accountant for Southern Technologies Corporation, discovers that her supervisor, Elise Silverton, made several errors last year. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. Game Theory Metaphors | SpringerLink Charisma unifies people supposedly because people aim to be as successful as the leader. As such, it will be useful to consider each model using a traditional normal-form game setup as seen in Table 1. For example, it is unlikely that even the actor themselves will be able to effectively quantify their perception of capacity, riskiness, magnitude of risk, or magnitude of benefits. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Use integration to find the indicated probabilities. The area of international relations theory that is most characterized by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory.Although the imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were outgrowths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually are to be found in the area of mathematics. A hurried U.S. exit will incentivize Afghanistans various competing factions more than ever before to defect in favor of short-term gains on the assumption that one of the lead hunters in the band has given up the fight. [8] If truly present, a racing dynamic[9] between these two actors is a cause for alarm and should inspire strategies to develop an AI Coordination Regime between these two actors. It is also the case that some human interactions that seem like prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be stag hunts. Table 8. Payoff matrix for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. On the face of it, the USSR Swerved, but I believe that both sides actually made concessions, although the US made theirs later on, to save face. The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts : Networks Also, trade negotiations might be better thought of as an iterated game the game is played repeatedly and the nations interact with each other more than once over time. Back to the lionesses in Etosha National Park . GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS - University of South Carolina If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. Here if they all act together they can successfully reproduce, but success depends on the cooperation of many individual protozoa. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime. As a result of this, security-seeking actions such as increasing technical capacity (even if this is not explicitly offensive this is particularly relevant to wide-encompassing capacity of AI) can be perceived as threatening and met with exacerbated race dynamics. An example of the game of Stag Hunt can be illustrated by neighbours with a large hedge that forms the boundary between their properties. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. International Cooperation Theory and International Institutions The hunters hide and wait along a path. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. In the context of the AI Coordination Problem, a Stag Hunt is the most desirable outcome as mutual cooperation results in the lowest risk of racing dynamics and associated risk of developing a harmful AI. For instance if a=10, b=5, c=0, and d=2. This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. It is his argument: "The information that such an agreement conveys is not that the players will keep it (since it is not binding), but that each wants the other to keep it." While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. How can the security dilemma be mitigated and transcended? Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. Finally, a Stag Hunt occurs when the returns for both actors are higher if they cooperate than if either or both defect. In this paper, I develop a simple theory to explain whether two international actors are likely to cooperate or compete in developing AI and analyze what variables factor into this assessment. Even doing good can parallel with bad consequences. Learn how and when to remove these template messages, Learn how and when to remove this template message, "Uses of Game Theory in International Relations", "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt", "Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources", https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stag_hunt&oldid=1137589086, Articles that may contain original research from November 2018, All articles that may contain original research, Articles needing additional references from November 2018, All articles needing additional references, Wikipedia articles that are too technical from July 2018, Articles with multiple maintenance issues, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 12:51. They are the only body responsible for their own protection. Finally, the paper will consider some of the practical limitations of the theory. In a case with a random group of people, most would choose not to trust strangers with their success. Since this requires that the fish have no way to escape, it requires the cooperation of many orcas. Some observers argue that a precipitous American retreat will leave the countryand even the capital, Kabulvulnerable to an emboldened, undeterred Taliban given the limited capabilities of Afghanistans national security forces. Both games are games of cooperation, but in the Stag-hunt there is hope you can get to the "good" outcome. Prisoner's Dilemma - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game - Nature Although the development of AI at present has not yet led to a clear and convincing military arms race (although this has been suggested to be the case[43]), the elements of the arms race literature described above suggest that AIs broad and wide-encompassing capacity can lead actors to see AI development as a threatening technological shock worth responding to with reinforcements or augmentations in ones own security perhaps through bolstering ones own AI development program. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Prisoners Dilemma game. Here, values are measured in utility. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality : If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would h ave gone off in pursuit . War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. Nonetheless many would call this game a stag hunt. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. arguing that territorial conflicts in international relations follow a strategic logic but one defined by the cost-benefit calculations that . Continuous coordination through negotiation in a Prisoners Dilemma is somewhat promising, although a cooperating actor runs the risk of a rival defecting if there is not an effective way to ensure and enforce cooperation in an AI Cooperation Regime. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag -hunters . What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? The theory outlined in this paper looks at just this and will be expanded upon in the following subsection. As a result, concerns have been raised that such a race could create incentives to skimp on safety. Social Stability and Catastrophe Risk: Lessons From the Stag Hunt Here, this is expressed as P_(h|A or B) (A)h_(A or B). Overall, the errors overstated the companys net income by 40%. In this game "each player always prefers the other to play c, no matter what he himself plays. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. If, by contrast, each hunter patiently keeps his or her post, everyone will be rewarded with a lavish feast. So far, the readings discussed have commented on the unique qualities of technological or qualitative arms races. One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. Last Resort, Legitimate authority, Just cause, high probablity of succession, right intention, proportionality, casualities. Table 3. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. Gardner's vision, the removal of inferior, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole. An hour goes by, with no sign of the stag. For example, most land disputes, like the ongoing Chinese andJapanesedisputeover the Senkaku Islands, must be resolved bycompromisingin other areas of policy in order to achieve the goal. 714 0 obj In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. Individuals, factions and coalitions previously on the same pro-government side have begun to trade accusations with one another. 4 thoughts on " The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt' (2): For example international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Cooperation under the security dilemma. Deadlock is a common if little studied occurrence in international relations, although knowledge about how deadlocks are solved can be of practical and theoretical importance. It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. LTgC9Nif [42] Vally Koubi, Military Technology Races, International Organization 53, 3(1999): 537565. These differences create four distinct models of scenarios we can expect to occur: Prisoners Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken, and Stag Hunt. The current landscape suggests that AI development is being led by two main international actors: China and the United States. In the most common account of this dilemma, which is quite different from Rousseau's, two hunters must decide separately, and without the other knowing, whether to hunt a stag or a hare. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. trailer N-person stag hunt dilemmas Jorge M. Pachecol'*, Francisco C. Santos2, Max O. Souza3 and Brian Skyrms4 . Weiss, Uri, and Joseph Agassi. Under this principle, parties to an armed conflict must always distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military targets on the other. The paper proceeds as follows. The article states that the only difference between the two scenarios is that the localized group decided to hunt hares more quickly. If one side cooperates with and one side defects from the AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows (here we assume Actor A defects while Actor B cooperates): For the defector (here, Actor A), the benefit from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that they believe such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI times Actor As perceived benefit of receiving AI with distributional considerations [P_(b|A) (AB)b_Ad_A]. Collision isdisastrousfor everyone, but swerving is losing bad too. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. This subsection looks at the four predominant models that describe the situation two international actors might find themselves in when considering cooperation in developing AI, where research and development is costly and its outcome is uncertain. Finally, if both sides defect or effectively choose not to enter an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from this scenario is solely the probability that they achieve a beneficial AI times each actors perceived benefit of receiving AI (without distributional considerations): P_(b|A) (A)b_Afor Actor A and P_(b|B) (B)b_Bfor Actor B. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. Using the payoff matrix in Table 6, we can simulate scenarios for AI coordination by assigning numerical values to the payoff variables. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. The complex machinations required to create a lasting peace may well be under way, but any viable agreementand the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces that would entailrequires an Afghan government capable of holding its ground on behalf of its citizens and in the ongoing struggle against violent extremism. In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms.
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